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THE LOOTING OF IRAQI ART: OCCUPIERS AND COLLECTORS TURN
AWAY LEISURELY FROM THE DISASTER
Amy E. Millert
In Breughel's Icarus, for instance: how everything turns away
Quite leisurely from the disaster; the ploughman may
Have heard the splash, the forsaken cry,
But for him it was not an important failure; the sun shone
As it had to on the white legs disappearing into the green
Water; and the expensive delicate ship that must have seen
Something amazing, a boy falling out of the sky,
had somewhere to get to and sailed calmly on.'
L Introduction
There is a plant which grows at the bottom of the ocean that, when
eaten, returns man to his youth. One man, Gilgamesh, tied rocks to his feet,
sank deep below the waves of the sea and plucked the plant from the ocean
floor. When he returned to the surface he was afraid to eat it and decided to
travel home, to the city of Uruk, to test the plant's powers on an old man
living there. He crossed many mountains and oceans during his trip, and
one night while he lay sleeping a snake slithered up to Gilgamesh and ate
the magic plant. When the snake slipped away he left his old skin behind,
and ever since that day, snakes have shed their skin reclaiming their youth.2
The foregoing is an excerpt from the Epic of Gilgamesh, which art his-
torians consider the oldest written story on Earth, even pre-dating the Iliad.
The tale unfolds on twelve stone tablets, which archeologists discovered in
Nineveh, Iraq, amidst ruins of the library of an Assyrian king who ruled
from 669-633 B.C. 3 Where are these tablets now? Nobody knows. They
are just some of the thousands of artifacts stolen or destroyed in April 2003
t B.A., Smith College (1999); J.D. Case Western Reserve University School of Law
(2005). I would like to thank Hiram Chodosh for his guidance in developing the structure
and focus of this Note. I would also like to thank Nikhil for his superb proofreading and
thoughtful advice. Finally, my mother, Susan, and my sisters, Suzanne and Kate, deserve my
sincere gratitude for their support and good humor through each of my endeavors.
I WYNSTAN HUGH AUDEN, Musee des Beaux Arts, in COLLECTED POEMS OF W.H. AUDEN,
146-147 (Edward Mendelson ed., 1976).
2 RICHARD HOOKER, THE EPIC OF GILGAMESH: TABLET X1, summarizing the translation of
Maureen Gallery Kovacs, THE EPIC OF GILGAMESH (1990).
3 Id.
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during the widespread looting and destruction following the invasion of
Iraq.
In the months following the military offensive, U.S. and Iraqi investi-
gators began to find priceless pieces of art turning up in the most peculiar
places. In one instance, a man drove his car up to the National Museum and
revealed the 5,000 year old Vase of Warka, stolen during the looting, lying
in fourteen broken pieces in the trunk of his car.4 Ancient worshipers used
this four foot tall vase, made of limestone and marked by delicate carvings,
in ritual ceremonies dating back to 3200 BC and it represents the oldest
known depiction of ritual observance in the world.5 A few days after the
thrilling recovery of the Warka Vase, Iraqi police and U.S. soldiers discov-
ered the 5,500 pound marble Warka sculpture.6 Experts value the sculpture
at thirty million dollars and it represents the most valuable possession of the
Iraqi National Museum stolen during the mass looting.7 Police located the
sculpture, which depicts a female head, under a few feet of soil in a private
orchard outside of Baghdad. Later in the week, investigating authorities
searched a flower shop in Baghdad and discovered two 12 century swords,
allegedly used by the heroic Islamic warrior Salahadin.
9
Many priceless antiquities that remained intact for five millennia now
lay shattered and almost destroyed.1 ° Milestones of Iraq's artistic and scien-
tific past trickle back to the museums and libraries under an amnesty pro-
gram, by which Iraqis can return items to museum officials and American
investigators without fear of prosecution.11 However, most experts believe
that the truly priceless relics of Iraq's lost civilizations might never return.'
2
4 Richard Lloyd Parry, Looted Pounds 20m Statue is Found Buried in Garden, THE
LONDON TIMEs, Sept. 18, 2003, at 18.
5 David Filipov, Sumerian Mona Lisa returned to National Museum, BOSTON GLOBE,
Sept. 24, 2003, at A14.
6 Parry, supra note 4, at 18 (estimating the sculpture's worth at twenty million British
pounds).
7 Id.
8 Ancient Iraqi Sculpture Found, BBC News World Edition, Sept. 18, 2003, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/entertainment/3118878.stm.
9 E.A. Torriero, 5,500-year-old mask lost in Iraq looting is recovered, CHI. TRIB., Sept.
18, 2003, at C1.
10 Rajiv Chandrasekaran, 'Our Heritage is Finished' Looters Destroyed What War Did
Not, WASH. POST, Apr. 13, 2003, at Al (stating that the looting which occurred as Saddam
Hussein's regime crumbled was largely unchecked by U.S. soldiers, and that the pillage
caused more damage to "Iraq's civilian infrastructure and economy than three weeks of U.S.
bombing").
11 Ewen MacAskill, Marines Accuse Baghdad Museum of Hampering Hunt for Treasures,
THE GUARDIAN, May 6, 2003, at 12 ("Col. Bogdanus [sic] has offered an amnesty to anyone
returning stolen goods. 'No questions asked means no questions asked,' he said. About 200
pieces have been returned under this offer...").
12 See, e.g., Layla AI-Zubaidi, Selling-Out Iraq"s Cultural Heritage, ZNet, Apr. 29, 2003,
available at http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfin?SectionID=15&ItemID=3538
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Over 10,000 artifacts remain missing from museums, galleries, and excava-
tion sites in Iraq and many scholars believe that these objects may remain
covertly protected in private collections forever. 1
3
This Note examines the responsibility of the United States government
as an occupying power in Iraq during the devastating looting and cultural
ruin that swept the nation in April 2003. The dominant focus of media and
public attention concerning the 2003 invasion of Iraq centered on Iraq's
weapons program and political leadership; however, this Note bypasses
these topics and focuses instead on one discrete area of the conflict: the de-
struction of cultural antiquities in Iraq. Section II begins by discussing the
importance of Iraqi antiquities in the international art market, both histori-
cally and economically. Part B reviews the looting activities following the
1991 Persian Gulf War. Part C discusses the relevant laws that impact the
international art market and the protection of cultural property. Part D iden-
tifies the multitude of advisors and experts who warned the United States of
imminent looting in Iraq following an invasion. Part E describes the U.S.
military's failure to prevent the pillage. Lastly, Part F includes a description
of occupation law and the pertinent obligations of an occupying State with
respect to cultural property in the occupied territory. Section III argues that
the United States' inability to protect Iraqi art from looting constitutes a
breach of its responsibility under international occupation law. Section IV
debates the merits of a managed art market and discusses the option of in-
volving Iraq in an open international art market with managed trade. Fi-
nally, Section V concludes that the chaotic state of the international art mar-
ket coupled with the United States' omission to act on its international obli-
gation to protect Iraq's cultural property contributed to the dramatic scale of
the looting in Iraq.
I. Looting Iraqi Art: Before and After
A. Iraqi Antiquities
Iraq is home to one of the richest cultural treasure troves in the world.
Babylonians, Sumerians, and Assyrians lived in the fertile region called
Mesopotamia, which is wedged between the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers,
and the remnants of their civilizations remain a hot commodity on the art
market today. In 1994, the art world watched in amazement as a six foot
long wall panel, attributed to the Assyrian empire, sold at an auction for
(reporting that "antiquities are neither renewable nor repairable" and that "while certain parts
of infrastructure may be rebuilt, cultural goods once removed from their context cannot be
replaced"; Even if the objects are found again on the antiquity market, "it is extremely hard
to put them back into context: to verify whether they are original or fake, which sites they
come from and which historical periods they have belonged to").
13 id.
20051
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U.S. $11.8 million - the highest price ever paid for an antiquity. 14 Art histo-
rians believe that the stone panel, which portrays a eunuch and a divine
form with wings, 15 formed part of an interior wall of one of the great Assyr-
ian palaces of Nineveh, Iraq.16 In ancient times, large slabs of stone covered
palace walls with carvings and relief images of wars and battles, celebrating
the victories of kings and their armies and recording the destruction of con-
quered enemy cities.17 The stone panel sold in 1994 at the Christie's auc-
tion was a spectacular testament of ancient history, and because the relief
survived wars and time in such remarkable condition, its value cannot be
overstated.
Every year, archaeologists discover new cities and uncover secrets of
ancient civilizations buried deep under the sands of Iraq. In 1989, the
American archeologist Elizabeth C. Stone discovered one of the oldest lost
cities in southern Iraq - Mashkan.18 Dr. Stone identified the city palace,
cemetery, and manufacturing quarters, and because the city was abandoned
suddenly, the fleeing residents left behind numerous pieces of daily domes-
tic life that provide a fascinating look into ancient lifestyles.19 The ancient
city of Mashkan represents a prime example of what this historically sig-
nificant area means to art historians and archaeologists. The civilizations
that spread across the Mesopotamian region were responsible for the
world's first documented written language, legal structure (including the
oldest known records of a murder trial)2° and astronomical research. 21 Un-
doubtedly, more discoveries are on the horizon and this promise of future
unearthed treasure heightens the pressure to protect and preserve this valu-
able area.
It is a painstaking, and seemingly endless, task to uncover the cultural
treasures of Iraq. Because ancient cities were built upon one another, they22
created stacks of civilizations that are difficult to separate. Mesopotamian
art can also be hard to locate because, unlike ancient Egygtians, people in
this area did not bury their dead with large quantities of art. 3 As a result of
the difficulties in excavation, demand for Iraqi antiquities far outstrips sup-
14 Mike Toner, The Past in Peril, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Sept. 19, 1999, at H2.
15 Rita Reif, Gleaming Antiquities From Ancient Mesopotamia, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1994,
§ 2, at47.
16 John Malcolm Russell, The Modern Sack of Nineveh and Nimrud, CULTURE WITHOUT
CONTEXT (Illicit Antiquities Res. Centre, Cambridge, Eng.), Autumn 1997, Issue 1 available
at http://www.mcdonald.cam.ac.uk/IARC/cwoc/contents.htm.
17 id.
18 John Noble Wilford, Archeologists Discover A Lost Rival to Babylon, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
11, 1989, at C1.
19 Id.
20 Bruce Lambert, Thorkild Jacobsen, Scholar, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1993, at B12.
21 Filipov, supra note 5, at A14.
22 Wilford, supra note 18, at Cl.
23 Reif, supra note 15, § 2, at 47.
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ply.24 Understandably, the discoveries that reach the art market, legal or
otherwise, are richly rewarded by collectors who are willing to pay any-
where from tens of thousands to millions of dollars for a small piece of pre-
served ancient life.
B. Post-Gulf War Lessons
It was these valuable artifacts that looters swarmed to find in the weeks
and months after the 1991 Persian Gulf War (the "1991 War"), often leav-
ing excavation sites across Iraq with bulldozers filled with soil containing
clay cuneiform tablets, bowls, and ancient pieces of art.25 Saddam Hussein
managed to protect the National Museum in Baghdad from looters; how-
ever, the Iraqi government left nine of Iraq's thirteen regional museums
unguarded and they were heavily plundered. Looters devastated these mu-
seums with what experts define as spontaneous stealing, but over time a
calculated and professional ring of art thieves 
took over.2p
Several archeological dig sites, some spanning the length of 40 or 50
football fields,27 suffered greatly from air attacks in addition to the looting
during the 1991 war.28 There are over 10,000 of these vast excavation areas
in Iraq, 29 making these sites notoriously hard to protect during war and un-
rest, both because of their exposed location, increasing their susceptibility to
air raids and looters, but also because of the sheer number of locations
throughout the country. In the days before the United States' 2003 inva-
sion, museum curators and historians in Iraq recalled the devastation of the
looting after the 1991 War, and they were not prepared to let it happen
again.
In anticipation of the United States' attack, Iraqi museum officials fo-
cused on protecting what they could and packed up countless pieces of art
from museums across the country and hid them in underground vaults and
secret locations. 3' These museum officials knew that even local leaders
24 Cf John Henry Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking About Cultural Property, 80 AM. J.
INT'L. L. 831, (1986) (discussing that source nations possess a supply of cultural property
that exceeds internal demand, and market nations experience a demand for antiquities that
outstrips their supply).
25 Hugh Dellios, Archeologists Visit Old Digs in Baghdad, CHI. TRJB., Mar. 25, 2001, at
C3.
26 Martin Gottlieb & Barry Meier, Afteraffects: The Plunder; Of 2,000 Treasures Stolen in
Gulf War of 1991, Only 12 Have Been Recovered, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2003, at A16.
27 Dellios, supra note 25, at C3.
28 Kim Sengupta, Treasures of Babylon Are Moved As Bombers Strike, THE INDEP.
LONDON, Sept. 30, 2002, at 10.
29 Gottlieb & Meier, supra note 26, at A16.
30 Guy Gugliotta, Pentagon was Told of Risk to Museums, WASH. POST, Apr. 14, 2003, at
A19.
31 Sengupta, supra note 28, at 10.
2005]
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could not be trusted, because many of these individuals accepted pa ments
and allowed dealers to pillage historical sites after the 1991 War.3  Iraqi
museum workers, archaeologists and art scholars remained concerned as a
U.S. invasion appeared imminent because of the particularly delayed and
flawed communication they experienced with the United States government
during the 1991 War.33 These scholars reminded the United States of its
defective performance regarding the preservation of Iraqi antiquities, and
they enlisted the Pentagon's help to prevent such a disaster from repeating
itself.34 In addition to these warnings from art experts, international art
preservation organizations also reminded the United States of its shortcom-
ings during the 1991 War and urged the United States government to adhere
strictly to international legal principles regulating the protection of cultural
property during times of war.
35
C. The Impact of Art Law
At the time the United States invaded Iraq in April 2003, the interna-
tional art market struggled to conform to sweeping changes in the laws gov-
erning the sale and purchase of antiquities. These new laws, or new inter-
pretations of old laws, reflect the modern commitment of nations to advo-
cate robust rules to protect their cultural property. However, because these
laws reduce the amount of art allowed for legal export, they also create a
volatile environment ripe for an expanding illegal market. It was this vola-
tility that played a major role in the widespread looting and destruction of
Iraq's cultural antiquities in April 2003.
1. Domestic Antiquities Law
In the United States, the National Stolen Protection Act ("NSPA")36
represents the most prominent law available to prosecute individuals guilty
of transferring and receiving stolen foreign antiquities. Until recently, U.S.
courts limited prosecution under the NSPA to crimes originating in the
United States; recent case law however has expanded the coverage of
crimes available for prosecution under the NSPA to foreign instances of
32 Barry Meier & Martin Gottlieb, An Illicit Journey Out of Egypt, Only a Few Questions
Asked, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 23, 2004, at Al.
33 See also Eleanor Robson, The Collection Lies in Ruins, Objects from a Long, Rich Past
in Smithereens', THE GUARDIAN, Apr. 14, 2003, at 5.
34 Gugliotta, supra note 30, at A19 (quoting McGuire Gibson, an specialist in Iraq culture,
as stating "we wanted to make sure this didn't happen again;" pentagon officials agreed and
said "they would be very aware and would try to protect the artifacts.").
35 Gottlieb & Meier, supra note 26, at A16.
36 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (2002).
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theft.3 7 This demonstrates a dramatic shift in U.S. law and it represents a
source of great concern for many art dealers and collectors whose antiqui-
ties interests involve foreign sales and purchases. The United States no
longer provides safe harbor to individuals who deal in foreign cultural prop-
erty with a checkered past.
The expansion of the NSPA began in 1974, when courts in the United
States first began to indict and convict individuals for the theft of foreign
cultural property under the NSPA. 38 After 1979, there was a 22-year lull in
the prosecution of individuals, under the NSPA, who bought or sold stolen
foreign antiquities and brought them into the United States. 39 The legal
tides changed in 2002 with the Second Circuit's decision in United States v.
Schultz, 40 holding that the defendant violated the NSPA when he knowingly
received stolen Egyptian antiquities through foreign commerce.4'
The NSPA prohibits the transportation "in interstate or foreign com-
merce (of) any goods ... of the value of $5,000 or more" with knowledge
that such goods were "stolen, converted or taken by fraud.' '42 The NSPA
also applies to anyone who "receives, conceals, stores, barters, sells, or dis-
poses of any goods ... of the value of $5,000 or more ... moving as, or
which are part of, or which constitute interstate or foreign commerce, know-
",43ing the same to have been stolen, unlawfully converted, or taken ....
Congress enacted the NSPA to deter and punish individuals who stole as
well as those who received stolen property. 44 The language of the NSPA
37 See United States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that defendant vio-
lated the NSPA when he knowingly received stolen Egyptian antiquities through foreign
commerce) (emphasis added).
38 United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430, 440 n.14 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding that the lan-
guage of the NSPA "is broad enough to justify the federal courts in applying the statute
whenever they determine that the [property was] stolen in another country."). See also U-
nited States v. Hollinshead, 495 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir. 1974) (upholding the conviction of de-
fendants under the NSPA for conspiracy to transport stolen pre-Columbian artifacts in inter-
state commerce). The Hollinshead court required the prosecution to prove that defendants
knew that the artifacts transported were stolen, but defendants' lack of knowledge regarding
where the artifacts were stolen and their lack of understanding of Guatemalan law was irrele-
vant. The Court held that defendants' conduct and admissions compelled the conclusion that
they knew that it was contrary to Guatemalan law to remove the artifacts from Guatemala.
39 William G. Pearlstein, Claims For The Repatriation of Cultual Property, 28 LAW &
POL'Y INT'L BUS. 123, 132 (1996).
40 Schultz, 333 F.3d at 393.
4 ld. at 416.
42 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (2002).
43 id.
44 E.g. United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988, 994 (5th Cir. 1977) (discussing congres-
sional intent to enact stolen property statutes which "would discourage both the receiving of
stolen goods and the initial taking"; this discouragement was intended to help states retrieve
stolen property once it had crossed state lines, however "Sections 2314 and 2315 refer not
only to interstate commerce, but to foreign commerce as well").
2005]
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clearly includes "foreign commerce" and thus, it is entirely appropriate to
apply the NSPA to thefts completed abroad and to the successive importa-
tion of the goods into the United States.45
In 1977, United States v. McClain 46 became one of the first cases in
United States history to apply the NSPA to the theft of foreign cultural
property under the jurisdiction of universality.47 The McClain court held
that the NSPA applied to illegal exportation of artifacts declared by Mexi-
can law to be the property of Mexico. 4 In this case, the defendants were
indicted under the NSPA and convicted of conspiring to transport and re-
ceive pre-Columbian artifacts that they knew were stolen from archeologi-
cal excavation sites in Mexico. The McClain court stated that so long as the
foreign nation had an explicit declaration of national ownership over all
antiquities found on its soil - not mere export restrictions - then any illegal
exportation from that nation can be considered theft, and will invoke the
NSPA.49
Although the United States had a historical policy encouraging the im-
portation of art objects which were over 100 years old,50 the McClain court
held that this traditional U.S. policy did not narrow the scope of the NSPA
so as to render it "inapplicable to artifacts declared to be the property of
another country and illegally imported into this country."5' This was a
groundbreaking case because the court applied a United States law to punish
individuals who violated a foreign national ownership law in spite of a tra-
ditional U.S. policy of tolerance. 52 The principle in this case reinforces the
45 Id.
46 United States v. McClain, 593 F.2d 658 (5th Cir. 1979); see also Patty Gerstenblith,
Selling the Past: Criminal Intent, ARCHAEOLOGY, at http://www.archaeology.org/ maga-
zine.php?page=online/features/schultz/criminal ("Ultimately a conviction was obtained only
on a conspiracy charge, but it still set up the principle that national ownership laws create
ownership so that when antiquities are stolen, individuals can be prosecuted under the
NSPA.").
47 The universality doctrine states that a court has criminal jurisdiction if the nation where
that reviewing court is located has the defendant in custody.
48 McClain, 545 F.2d at 988.
41 Id at 1000-1001.
50 Law on Importation of Pre-Columbian Monumental or Architectural Sculpture or Mu-
rals, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2091-95 (2000) [hereinafter Importation Act] (allowing the importation of
pre-Columbian artifacts into the United States, with the exception of certain types of artifacts
which warrant a civil penalty of forfeiture).
"1 McClain, 593 F.2d at 664.
52 If the McClain court had not applied the NSPA to the defendant's conduct, it is unlikely
that the defendant would have been convicted under the Importation Act. Any object im-
ported in violation of the Importation Act "shall be seized and subject to forfeiture under the
customs laws." "The Importation Act prohibits the importation into the United States of
"stone carvings and wall art which are pre-Columbian monumental or architectural sculpture
or murals." The latter term is defined in § 2095(3) as any stone carving or wall art (or frag-
ment or part thereof) that (1) is the product of pre- Columbian Indian culture of Mexico,
[Vol. 37:49
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principle that an art dealer or collector may not break antiquities laws
abroad and then escape punishment by seeking refuge in the United States.
In Schultz,53 a federal court convicted Frederick Schultz, a successful
New York art dealer, of knowingly receiving stolen Egyptian antiquities
through foreign commerce in violation of the NSPA. The court's opinion
began with a scalding reproach of unscrupulous individuals who seek to
profit at the expense of the preservation of a legendary civilization 54 and
referenced the McClain decision by stating that the Schultz case was not the
first time American law recognized the "special" property interest created
by a foreign patrimony law.5 The Court cited Section 2315 of the NSPA
which enumerates an express provision for foreign commerce, and which
has consistently "been applied to thefts in foreign countries and subsequent
transportation into the United States ' 56 and sentenced Frederick Schultz to
serve thirty-three months in prison, in addition to paying a $50,000 fine and
returning a valuable ancient sculpture to Egypt as restitution.57
The Second Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence of Schultz by
stating, "[w]e conclude that the NSPA applies to property that is stolen from
a foreign government, where that government asserts actual ownership of
the property pursuant to a valid patrimony law.",58 The valid patrimony law
discussed in Schultz refers to Egypt's Law 117, which asserts state owner-
ship over all antiquities discovered on Egyptian soil. Egypt actively en-
forces Law 117, at home and abroad, prosecuting dozens of serious viola-
tions and confiscating all newly discovered antiquities excavated from
Egyptian soil. 59 The Schultz case marks the first reliance of a U.S. court on
Egypt's Law 117 to secure a conviction under the NSPA.
Central America, South America, or the Caribbean Islands; (2) was an immobile monument
or architectural structure or was a part of, or affixed to, any such monument or structure; and
(3) is subject to export control by the country of origin." Therefore, since many of the arti-
facts stolen and transferred by the defendant in McClain were movable items such as "ce-
ramic dishes, pots, or figurines that were likely not affixed to monuments or walls," many of
these items may not have fallen within the meaning of the Importation Act, and thus, the
defendant would not have been guilty of any violation. McClain, 593 F.2d at 664 nn.5-6.
53 United States v. Schultz, 178 F. Supp. 2d 445 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff'd, 333 F.3d 393 (2d
Cir. 2003).
54 Id. at 446. "The marvelous artifacts of ancient Egypt, so wondrous in their beauty and
in what they teach of the advent of civilization, inevitably invite the attention, not just of
scholars and aesthetes, but of tomb-robbers, smugglers, black-marketeers, and assorted
thieves. Every pharaoh, it seems, has a price on his head (at least if the head is cast in stone);
and if the price is right, a head-hunter will be found to sever the head from its lawful owner."
55 Id.
56 Id. at 448 citing McClain, 545 F.2d at 994.
57 Martha B. G. Lufkin, End of the Era of Denial for Buyers of State-Owned Antiquities:
United States v. Schultz, INT'L J. OF CUE. PROP., Vol. 11, No. 2, 305, 316 (2002).
58 Schultz, 333 F.3d at 416
59 Id. at 401; see also Lufkin, supra note 57, at 313-314.
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Many art dealers and collectors reacted with extreme emotion to the
court's opinion in the Schultz case. They argued that U.S. courts set a dan-
gerous precedent by permitting an NSPA indictment based on foreign pat-
rimony laws, and they claimed that the Schultz decision would "have a
catastrophic impact on the art world and the public interests it serves. 6 °
Indeed, the Schultz case intensified the growing apprehension that many
individuals felt toward international art trade, illustrating the impact that the
NSPA indictments and patrimony claims exert over the United States art
market.
Patrimony claims are requests by a foreign State for the return of an
antiquity which has either been stolen from the source nation or exported in
violation of a national law which prohibits the exportation of art from the
nation of origin. 61 With patrimony claims increasing each year, dealers and
collectors are subject to the increasing risks of expensive lawsuits and the
possibility of losing valuable pieces of art due to these repatriation de-
mands. In light of this developing trend, the District Court's application of
the NSPA in Schultz cautions members of the foreign art trade to investigate
their purchases thoroughly, regarding issues of foreign national patrimony
rights, and to avoid sticking their heads in the proverbial sand.62
2. Foreign Antiquities Law
In addition to heeding NSPA guidelines in the United States, partici-
pants in the international art market must also concern themselves with for-
eign antiquities laws which ban the exportation of artifacts from their nation
of origin ("source nation"). Egypt's Law 117: The Law on the Protection of
Antiquities ("Law 117 ,)63 illustrates a growing trend among nations, with
60 Lufldn, supra note 57, at 316 ("Dealers, collectors and museums will be forced to aban-
don the trade and collection of any objects that any foreign government may ultimately claim
... Existing collections also will be affected: collectors and museums that acquired objects in
good faith reliance on U.S. law will be placed at risk").
61 Pearlstein, supra note 39, at 123-124.
62 Lufkin, supra note 57, at 318.
63 Law 117: The Law on the Protection of Antiquities (1983). The following are the rele-
vant provisions of Law 117:
Article 1
An "Antiquity" is any movable or immovable property that is a product of any of the vari-
ous civilizations or any of the arts, sciences, humanities and religions of the successive
historical periods extending from prehistoric times down to a point one hundred years be-
fore the present, so long as it has either a value or importance archaeologically or histori-
cally that symbolizes one of the various civilizations that have been established in the land
of Egypt or that has a historical relation to it, as well as human and animal remains from
any such period.
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rich deposits of cultural artifacts, intent on protecting their national cultural
identities by prohibiting collectors and dealers from removing antiquities
from their historical origin. U.S. courts have interpreted Law 117 as pro-
tecting all antiquities found in Egypt after 1983, claiming that this property
belongs to the Egyptian government, and banning the export of this property
out of Egypt.64
Many of the source nations initiating patrimony claims are typically
poor countries that control vast quantities of treasured artifacts and whose
citizens participate in the illegal art trade for economic survival. 65 Partici-
pants in the illegal art market profit from their nation's desire to maintain
"found-in-the-ground" laws, requiring that artifacts found in the soil of a
country must stay in that country.66 Such laws are a valiant, yet seemingly
vain effort, to protect and preserve the art history of a nation. In reality,
nationalistic art laws catch a small percentage of offenders, and serve in-
stead to fuel a hungry illegal art market by limiting the stream of artifacts
flowing into an international art market where demand already outstrips
supply.
67
Article 6
All antiquities are considered to be public property - except for charitable and religious
endowments .... It is impermissible to own, possess or dispose of antiquities except pur-
suant to the conditions set forth in this law and its implementing regulations.
Article 7
As of [1983], it is prohibited to trade in antiquities.
Article 8
With the exception of antiquities whose ownership or possession was already established
or is established pursuant to [this law's] provisions, the possession of antiquities shall be
prohibited as from [1983]. Law 117 includes a chapter entitled "Sanctions and Penalties"
detailing the criminal penalties to be imposed on persons found to have violated the law.
This section provides that a person who "unlawfully smuggles an antiquity outside the Re-
public or participates in such an act shall be liable to a prison term with hard labor and a
fine of not less than 5,000 and not more than 50,000 pounds." A person who steals or con-
ceals a state-owned antiquity faces a prison term of three to five years and a minimum fine
of 3,000 pounds. A person who removes or detaches an antiquity from its place, counter-
feits an antiquity, or unlawfully disposes of an antiquity faces a prison term of one to two
years and a minimum fine of 100 pounds. A person who writes on, posts notices on, or ac-
cidentally defaces an antiquity faces a prison term of three to twelve months and/or a fine
of 100 to 500 pounds. Laws as referenced in United States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393, 399-
400 (2d Cir. 2003).
64 Schultz, 333 F.3d at 401; see also Lufkin, supra note 57, at 313-314.
65 Cf. Howard Reich, Treasures Easy Pickings, CI. TRIB., Apr. 28, 2003, at 1; see also
James Nafziger, Regulation by the International Council of Museums: An Example of the
Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in the Transnational Legal Process, 2 DENV. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y. 231, 232-233 n.6 (1972).
66 Pearlstein, supra note 39, at 128.
67 Cf COLIN RENFREW, TRADE IN ILLICIT ANTIQUITIES: THE DESTRUCTION OF THE WORLD'S
ARCHAEOLOGICAL HERITAGE, ED. NEIL BRODIE, JENNIFER DOOLE & COLIN RENFREW, xi,
McDonald Institute Monographs (2001) (discussing the importance of persuading collectors
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Turkey provides another example of a country so rich in prized antiqui-
ties that many consider it the largest single source of antiquities for the
United States market. 68 Turkey leads the way in patrimony claims - many
of them successful - and often museums and collectors choose to settle their
disagreements outside of court rather than pay for lengthy trials.69 In Re-
public of Turkey v. Metropolitan Museum of Art,70 Turkey brought suit
against the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York ("Met") to regain
possession of artifacts that were excavated from Turkish burial sites in 1966
and exported to the United States in violation of Turkey's patrimony law, 71
which, established in 1906, confers ownership of all antiquities found in
Turkey to the Turkish government. 72 The Met filed a motion to dismiss, but
the district court denied the motion because it found genuine issues of mate-
rial fact as to whether the Met purchased the artifacts in good faith.73 In
1993, the Met agreed to settle the dispute with Turkey - based on compel-
ling evidence which suggested that the Met knew that the Turkish artifacts
were illegally excavated when it purchased them - and returned the entire
collection of artifacts to the Republic of Turkey. 74 Many nations have fol-
lowed Turkey's example by enacting strict national ownership laws within
their own countries.75 Once these nations understand that international law
provides no remedy for their claims against illegal exporters, they often
exercise a self-created solution whereby possession of a piece of art, even if
purchased in good faith, is nevertheless deemed illegal in light of their self-
executed national ownership laws. 76 This automatic presumption of owner-
ship by the source nations incites apprehension in collectors and dealers in
the international art market who must take painstaking measures to ensure
that their purchases will not become the subject of a future patrimony claim.
to stop purchasing unprovenanced antiquities with ambiguous legal lineage, because cus-
tomer demand perpetuates the widespread problem of looting and cultural devastation).
68 Pearlstein, supra note 39, at 137.
69 For example the return of the Elmali Treasure of silver coins from 4 h-century B.C.
Greece and the Kiyomuzi-Sannenska Museum's return of the Paul Klee watercolor "De-
serted Square of an Exotic Town" both represent art settlements in response to patrimony
claims. See also Melik Kaylan, On the Trial of Stolen Art, Forbes.com available at
http://www.forbes.com/2001/06/27/0627hot.html.
70 762 F. Supp. 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
"' Id. at 45.
72 Leonard Post, Law's True Art, THE NAT. LAW J., Jan. 13, 2003 available at
http://www.herrick.com/publications/default.asp?page=articles.
73 Republic of Turkey v. Metropolitan Museum of Art, 762 F. Supp. 44, 47.
74 Post, supra note 72 available at http://www.herrick.com/publications/default.asp?page=
articles.
7- See Nathan Vardi, The Return of the Mummy, Forbes.com, Dec. 22, 2003 (discussing
the patrimony laws of Turkey (1906), China (1982), Egypt (1983) and Italy (1902/1939)).
76 Jonathan S. Moore, Enforcing Foreign Ownership Claims in the Antiquities Market, 97
YALE L.J. 466, 470-471 (1988).
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3. International Law - The 1954 Hague Convention and UNESCO
In addition to the NSPA in the United States and foreign patrimony
laws in individual sovereign states, there is an extensive body of interna-
tional law intent on protecting the world's cultural property. The 1954
Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property ("1954 Hague
Convention") 77 and the Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Pre-
venting the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural
Property ("UNESCO Convention") 78 represent the two principal interna-
tional conventions which define cultural property and mandate its protec-
tion.79
The NSPA and foreign patrimony laws reinforce the notion that art be-
longs to its nation of origin, and must remain there unless the art was ex-
ported before the patrimony laws came into existence. This nationalistic
view of art represents a fundamental departure from the governing princi-
ples of international law.8° While the individual nations lay claim to any
piece of art found within their borders, the Hague Convention supports a
common cultural heritage philosophy8' reinforcing the idea that art belongs
collectively to the world. The 1954 Hague Convention has a rich history
and it remains the most important law to date charged with protecting cul-
tural property in wartime.
Throughout World War II, the international community had only the
1907 Hague Convention82 to guide it with respect to the regulation and pro-
tection of cultural property during wartime. In light of the fact that the 1907
Hague Convention failed to protect cultural property during World War ,83
77 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, May
14, 1954, art. 1, 249 U.N.T.S. 240, 244 [hereinafter 1954 Hague Convention].
78 823 U.N.T.S. 231 (1972), reprinted in 10 I.L.M. 289 (1971) [hereinafter UNESCO
Convention].
79 See Andrea Cunning, The Safeguarding of Cultural Property in Times of War & Peace
11 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 211, 223 (2003) (discussing the special legal status that the
1954 Hague Convention and UNESCO bestow upon cultural property).
80 The preamble to the UNESCO Convention, supra note 78, states: "Considering that
cultural property constitutes one of the basic elements of civilization and national culture,
and that its true value can be appreciated only in relation to the fullest possible information
regarding its origin, history and traditional setting... "(emphasis added).
81 Chip Colwell-Chanthaphonh & John Piper, War and Cultural Property, INT'L J. OF CUL.
PROP., Vol. 10, No. 2, 217, 226 (2001).
82 Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regu-
lation concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Jan 26, 1910, 187 Consol. T.S.
227 [hereinafter 1907 Hague Convention]; see also Colwell-Chanthaphonh & Piper, supra
note 81, at 222-223.
83 SHARON A. WILLIAMS, THE INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL PROTECTION OF MOVABLE
CULTURAL PROPERTY 18-19 (1977). As cited in Colwell-Chanthaphonh & Piper, supra note
81, at 222.
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due to modem innovations in warfare which the 1907 Convention never
conceived, 84 many doubted whether Europe's cultural treasures would sur-
vive World War II. Tragically, the worst fears came true, and it was this
extraordinary destruction of prized architecture and cultural icons in Europe
during the second world war that prompted the international community to
create and sign the 1954 Hague Convention. 85
The 1954 Hague Convention updated and improved the language of the
1907 Hague Convention to better protect cultural antiquities from the disas-
ters of modernized weaponry used in war.86 The 1907 Hague Convention
was far from obsolete, however. Although it did little to protect cultural
property during World War II, the Convention proved vital after the war
ended in convicting several members of the Nazi party, during the Nurem-
burg trials, for the pillage of cultural property.87 The 1954 Hague Conven-
tion solved many shortcomings from past agreements; however, there still
remained a crucial gap that would not be bridged for another sixteen years.
At this point in history, international law provided a written convention
protecting cultural antiquities principally during wartime. It was not until
1970, with the introduction of the UNESCO Convention, that international
law began to protect cultural property both during moments of war and
peace. The UNESCO Convention responded to deficiencies in the Hague
Conventions by addressing the rapidly expanding illegal art trade that the
existing conventions were powerless to stop.88 The UNESCO Convention
largely dedicates itself to protecting the world's antiquities by establishing a
cooperative network of nations who work together to prevent the illicit im-
port and export of cultural property.89 The signatories to the Convention
84 Colwell-Chanthaphonh & Piper, supra note 81, at 222.
85 Karl E. Meyer, Who Owns the Spoils of War?, ARCHEOLOGY, July-Aug. 1995, at 46.
"[N]ot since the Goths and Vandals had Europe witnessed so spiteful an assault on other
people's cultural treasures. The ancient cathedral at Novgorod was ravaged, Pushkin's house
ransacked, Tolstoy's manuscripts burned and everywhere museums, churches, libraries,
universities, and scientific institutes were robbed and destroyed."
86 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 77, at Art. 23-25.
87 Victoria A. Birov, Prize or Plunder?: The Pillage of Works ofArt and the International
Law of War, 30 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 201, 211 (Fall 1997 / Winter 1998).
88 UNESCO Convention, supra note 78, Article 2:
1. The States Parties to this Convention recognize that the illicit import, export and trans-
fer of ownership of cultural property is one of the main causes of the impoverishment of
the cultural heritage of the countries of origin of such property and that international co-
operation constitutes one of the most efficient means of protecting each country's cultural
property against all the dangers resulting therefrom.
2. To this end, the States Parties undertake to oppose such practices with the means at their
disposal, and particularly by removing their causes, putting a stop to current practices, and
by helping to make the necessary reparations.
89 UNESCO Convention, supra note 78, Article 9:
Any State Party to this Convention whose cultural patrimony is in jeopardy from pillage of
archaeological or ethnological materials may call upon other States Parties who are af-
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comprise the cooperative network; as of June 2003, 100 countries had rati-
fied the Convention9° including the United States and Iraq.
91
In the decades prior to the UNESCO Convention, international laws
governing cultural property were "honored more in their breach than in their
observance, 92 and it was this dilemma that the UNESCO Convention sought
to remedy. Thomas Hoving, a former director of the Met, notably wrote
"that with the UNESCO hearings, the age of piracy had ended., 93 However,
many dispute this assertion and argue instead that the UNESCO Convention
has done little to stem the tide of illegal trade in the international art mar-
ket.
94
4. Sanctions
In addition to cultural property laws limiting the trade of antiquities be-
tween nations, another element plunged Iraq into a climate that was condu-
cive to an illegal art trade: sanctions.95 When the United Nations imposed
sanctions against Iraq in 1990, the Iraqi economy fell into a deep recession
creating mass poverty among the Iraqi people.96 Thus, many would say that
the looting began years ago - when the 1991 War ended.97 Following the
war, extreme poverty caused mass looting throughout the nation's archeo-
logical excavation sites and museums, and in time these artifacts surfaced
fected. The States Parties to this Convention undertake, in these circumstances, to partici-
pate in a concerted international effort to determine and to carry out the necessary concrete
measures, including the control of exports and imports and international commerce in the
specific materials concerned. Pending agreement each State concerned shall take provi-
sional measures to the extent feasible to prevent irremediable injury to the cultural heritage
of the requesting State.
90 U.S. State Department, International Cultural Property Protection, International Law at
http://exchanges.state.gov/culprop/intlaws.html.
91 Reich, supra note 65, at 1.
92 Nafziger, supra note 65, at 232-33 n.6.
93 Thomas Hoving, Making the Mummies Dance (1993). See also Carol Kino, Cultural
property disputes are reshaping the art world-but how?, Culturebox, July 28, 2003, available
at http://slate.msn.com/id/2086136/.
94 COLIN RENFREW, supra note 67, at 2; "[A]Ithough the UNESCO Convention ... was
adopted as long ago as 1970, the destruction of archaeological sites through looting has in-
creased rather than diminished in the thirty succeeding years."
95 Toner, supra note 14, at H2.
96 Hershel Shanks, Plundering Iraq: Should Looted Antiquities be Returned to Rogue
States?, ARCHAEOLOGY ODYSSEY, Mar./Apr. 2002 (quoting John M. Russell as stating, "....
the economic sanctions essentially destroyed modern Iraqi culture, moving them quite a few
steps back in terms of their standard of living, standard of health and nutrition and so on.
The sanctions have been a disaster for everybody except Saddam.").
97 Reich, supra note 65, at 1.
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for sale in the illegal art market. 98  McGuire Gibson, President of the
American Association for Research in Baghdad, states that "[t]here has been
a tremendous, uninterrupted wave of looting and smuggling of antiquities
since the [1991] Gulf War - thousands of items a month." 99 The Coordina-
tor of the Illicit Antiquities Research Centre in England, Neil Brodie,
agrees: "All kinds of stuff has been flowing out of Iraq: stone reliefs, in-
scribed clay tablets, cylinder seals, pottery - you name it."'
0 0
Before the weakening of Saddam Hussein's power during the 1991
War, looting was an unthinkable crime.'10 Hussein, a great lover of art and
culture, enacted strict laws that protected Iraq's cultural treasures from ex-
portation when his party rose to power in the late 1960's. 02 "For decades,
the Iraqis kept a very tight lid on stuff, and there was very, very little getting
out," stated Professor Gibson.'0 3 However, once Iraq's economy began to
spin out of control due to the imposition of sanctions, Hussein was unable to
protect the thousands of precious excavation sites that meant money to the
needy Iraqi people.'04 "What the sanctions did brilliantly was to set up the
pre-conditions for training of a whole new set of antiquities looters."'1 5 In
the end, the United Nation's sanctions on Iraq meant terrible consequences
for the legitimate art market, as well as taking a destructive toll on the pres-
ervation of Iraqi antiquities.
D. Expert Warnings
Years before the devastating effects of sanctions permeated Iraq, nine
prominent art historians in the United States pleaded with White House of-
ficials to "take every possible measure to protect" Iraq's museums and his-
torical treasures on the eve of the 1991 War. 10 6 They argued, "[a]s special-
ists in the antiquities and history of Mesopotamia, we share . . . a special
responsibility for this crucial segment of our common cultural heritage."' 10 7
Although art scholars spoke these words in 1991, out of their anxiety to
9 Barbara Crossette, Ancient, Priceless and Gone with the War, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1996,
§ 4, at 5. ("International sanctions have impoverished the Iraqis, many of whom have sold
family heirlooms for food. Today the country's archeological treasures are ... up for sale.").
99 Reich, supra note 65, at 1.
100 Id.
101 Buried Treasure, WALL ST. J., Jan. 9, 2004, at WI 1. ("In legal, moral and ethical terms,
this museum always belonged to the people, [b]ut in reality it was always Saddam's.").
102 Reich, supra note 65, at 1.
103 Barbara Crossette, Iraqis, Hurt By Sanctions, Sell Priceless Antiquities, N.Y. TIMES,
June 23, 1996, at 1.
104 id.
105 Reich, supra note 65, at 1 (quoting the remarks of Tony Wilkinson, a professor of ar-
cheology at the University of Chicago).
106 William H. Honan, Concernfor Iraqi Antiquities, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1991, at C26.
107 Id.
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preserve Iraq's priceless antiquities from the looming war, these sentiments
were equally relevant in 2003. On the brink of the second conflict with
Iraq, individuals eager to prevent history from repeating itself made fresh
efforts to avert catastrophe.
In January 2003, just three months before the plundering in Iraq began,
dozens of art scholars and antiquities experts met with representatives of the
State Department and the Pentagon in Washington to discuss art protection
in Iraq. 108 In the face of what seemed like an inevitable invasion of Iraq, no
one wanted a repeat performance of the looting and destruction that oc-
curred during the 1991 War when looters ransacked nine of Iraq's museums
and stole over 4,000 objects. 0 9 The American Anthropological Association
was one of several groups that sent letters to President George W. Bush and
the Department of Defense urging them to "use all means" 1 0 to protect the
museums and ancient archaeological sites in Iraq from looters and thieves.
Art scholars and historians continued their campaign to warn the U.S.
government of the extreme vulnerability of Iraqi antiquities to pillaging and
destruction right up until the days before the invasion began.", They were
not alone. Former leaders, exiled from Iraq, and international relief experts
candidly informed U.S. officials of the looting and chaos that would likely
saturate the nation during and after the invasion.1 2 After countless meet-
ings and emails filled with words of admonition, these individuals left the
White House buoyed by assurances from government officials that their
advice would not be overlooked. 1 3  However, when the invasion com-
menced, any brief respite these crusaders of Iraqi culture experienced gave
way to the stinging reality that Washington had ignored their warning.
E. U.S. Inaction
The wanton looting and destruction that accompanied the United States
invasion of Iraq precisely fulfilled the worst fears of art scholars and histo-
rians around the world. Although U.S. tanks remained staunchly parked
108 Gugliotta, supra note 30, at A19.
109 Anita Ramasastry, Looting and Theft of Cultural Artifacts Continues in Iraq, YURICA
REP., Apr. 22, 2003, at http://www.yuricareport.com/Law%20&%2OLegal/Legal%20 Analy-
sis%20US%2OLiable%20in%20Iraq.html.
110 Id.
111 John Noble Wilford, Art Experts Fear Worst in the Plunder of a Museum, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 13, 2003, at B3; Douglas Jehl & Elizabeth Becker, A Nation at War: the Looting, Ex-
perts'Pleas to Pentagon Didn't Save Museum, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2003, B5.
112 Joel Brinkley & Eric Schmitt, The Struggle for Iraq: Prewar Planning, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 30, 2003, at 26 (quoting Massoud Barzani, leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, as
stating, "On many occasions, I told the Americans that from the very moment the regime fell,
if an alternative government was not ready there would be a power vacuum and there would
be chaos and looting ... Given our history, it is very obvious this would occur.").
113 Jehl & Becker, supra note 111 at B5.
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outside the Oil Ministry in Baghdad during the height of the looting, only
sporadic military personnel offered assistance to the besieged museums and
libraries just blocks away. 1 14  Eyewitnesses report that U.S. soldiers did
nothing when looters entered the National Museum in Baghdad and plun-
dered 120 rooms filled with priceless artifacts.1 5 Museum officials begged
the soldiers to intervene, but even a tank driving by just 50 yards away from
the museum entrance refused to stop and help.'6 One archaeologist ob-
served looters streaming out of the National Museum "carrying antiquities
on hand carts, bicycles and wheelbarrows and in boxes," and still he could
not convince the U.S. soldiers to station permanent tanks outside the mu-
seum to deter looters.'17
Amid the accusations of the U.S. military's neglect of Iraq's museums,
U.S. commanders respond that they simply lacked the manpower to prevent
the widespread pillaging. 18 One Marine officer stationed near the museum
stated that "we just don't have enough troops," because a large majority of
U.S. forces struggled against resistance forces during the looting sprees.19
Major General Stanley McChrystal characterized the situation as a simple
matter of priorities. 120 While looting was a problem during the invasion, it
typically did not claim lives, and, consequently, U.S. soldiers beset by en-
emy forces were compelled to relegate the issue of looting to a lesser prior-
ity. 12 1 Residents of the plundered cities opposed this measured decision and
114 Frank Rich, And now: Operation Iraqi Looting, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2003, § 2, at 1.
("If the United States had enough troops to secure the Oil Ministry, it surely had the very few
needed to ward off looters at the museum."); see also Jonathan Steele, Museum's Treasures
Left to the Mercy of Looters, THE GUARDIAN, Apr. 14, 2003, at 5.
115 John F. Bums, Looting; Pillagers Strip Iraqi Museum Of Its Treasure, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
13, 2003, at Al. See Fiachra Gibbons, Experts Mourn the Lion of Nimrud, Looted as Troops
Stood by, THE GUARDIAN, Apr. 30, 2003, at 5 (quoting Donny George, Curator at the Bagh-
dad Museum, as commenting, "[o]ne of our staff who lived in the museum compound went
to an American tank and pleaded with them, begged in fact, for them to come in front of the
museum to keep it safe, [b]ut he was told they had no orders to do so.").
116 Gibbons, supra note 115, at 5 (quoting Neil MacGregor, director of the British Mu-
seum, as stating that "[i]t's very extraordinary . . . that with American troops in Baghdad,
American troops almost at the gates of the museum, this was allowed to happen,").
117 Bums, supra note 115, at Al.
118 John F. Bums, Looting and a Suicide Attack As Chaos Grows in Baghdad, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 11, 2003, at Al.
119 Id.
120 See Coalition Forces Must Stop Iraqi Looting, Human Rights Watch, NY, Apr. 12,
2003 available at http://www.hrw.org/press/2003/04/iraq041203.htm. See also Rich, supra
note 114, § 2, at 1 (quoting another general (Richard Myers) as saying it was "a matter of
priorities").
"' Edmund L. Andrews, After the War: Treasures of Babylon, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2003,
at A14.
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proffered a theory that U.S. soldiers could have prevented the destruction if
American troops had taken control of each town as Iraqi troops fled.
122
F. Law of Occupation
The law of occupation is international law which governs the actions
and responsibilities of a nation's military occupation of a foreign terri-
tory. 123  Occupation law draws from many sources including the Fourth
Geneva Convention, 124 the 1907 Hague Regulations on the Laws of War,'25
Geneva Protocol 1,126 and by customary international law. 127 On March 20,
2003, President Bush announced to the world that the United States had
begun a "broad and concerted campaign" against Iraq, aimed at toppling the
regime of Saddam Hussein. 128 With this action, the United States triggered
the rules and responsibilities governed by international occupation law once
it established and exercised military authority over Iraq. 129
In May 2003, the United Nations Security Council, of which the
United States is a permanent member, affirmatively accepted the application
of international occupation law to the United States' actions in Iraq with
Resolution 1483.130 This Resolution confirms the actions of the United
States and Britain in Iraq and compels them to "recogniz[e] the specific
authorities, responsibilities, and obligations under applicable international
law... as occupying powers . . 'U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan
voiced his agreement that international laws of occupation must apply to the
United States during its occupation of Iraq, and "that the coalition has the
responsibility for the welfare of the people in this area."'
132
The 1907 Hague Convention marks the beginning of the United Na-
tions' concern with the protection of cultural and religious property during
122 David Rohde, In Newly Occupied Mosul, US. Colonel Faces 1.7 Million Added Re-
sponsibilities, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 13, 2003, at B5.
123 David J. Scheffer, Beyond Occupation Law, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 842, 860 n.2 (2003).
124 Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12,
1949, paras. 47-78, 6 UST 3516, 75 UNTS 287 [hereinafter Geneva IV].
125 1907 Hague Convention, supra note 82, paras. 42-56.
126 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, Dec. 7, 1978, paras. 14-15, 63, 69,
85, 1125 UNTS 3 [hereinafter Geneva Protocol I].
127 Scheffer, supra note 123, at 860 n. 2.
128 Iraq War Begins, PBS Newshour, available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/extra/
features/jan-june03/firstattack.html.
129 1907 Hague Convention, supra note 82, at para. 43.
130 SC Res. 1483 (May 22, 2003), 42 ILM 1016 (2003); see also Scheffer, supra note 123,
at 842.
131 SC Res. 1483 at 1016.
132 Ramasastry, supra note 109, at http://www.yuricareport.com/Law%20&%2OLegal/
Legal%20Analysis%20US%2OLiable%20in%20Iraq.html.
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periods of military authority by an occupying power. 33 The 1907 Conven-
tion requires that the occupying power use all methods at its disposal to
restore public order and to ensure safety. 134 Pillaging and the confiscation
of private property are strictly forbidden, and the Convention expressly
commands that the occupying power respect religious convictions and prac-
tices of the occupied territory. 1 E
The 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property
was the first international convention with the principal focus of protecting
the world's art. 136 The 1954 Convention outlines a mission to protect
"property of great importance to the cultural heritage of every people."' 37
Article 4 compels contracting parties to "prohibit, prevent, and if necessary,
put a stop to any form of theft, pillage, or misappropriation of, and any acts
of vandalism directed against cultural property." 138 This governing princi-
ple holds an occupying power to a high standard by requiring the occupying
State to promote the health and well being of the occupied nation's people,
in addition to preserving the country's cultural treasures and ancient antiqui-
ties. 139 Although the United States has not ratified the 1954 Convention -
although it is a signatory - the Convention is still binding law because it
codifies existing customary international law.
1 40
Under international occupation law, the United States' failure to pro-
tect Iraq's museums and libraries from looting represents a complete depar-
ture from the responsibilities of an occupying power governed by the 1907
and 1954 Hague Conventions, the Fourth Geneva Convention, Geneva Pro-
tocol I, and customary international law. The war planners acting on behalf
of the United States committed a grievous injury against the Iraqi people by
failing to protect their heritage. The laws of occupation govern the interna-
tional obligations of the occupying State, and the United States, as an occu-
pying power, breached its obligation under this body of law.
III. Who is Responsible? - The Burdens of Occupation Law
The image of President Bush flickered across television sets through-
out Iraq on April 10, 2003 with the declaration that the Iraqi people were
133 1907 Hague Convention, supra note 82, at para. 43.
134 id.
135 Id. at paras. 46-47.
136 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 77, at art. 1.
117 Id. at art. 1.
138 Id. at art. 4(3).
139 id.
140 Colwell-Chanthaphonh & Piper, supra note 81, at 228; see also Keith W. Eirinberg, The
United States Reconsiders the 1954 Hague Convention, 3 INT'L J. OF CULTURAL PROP. 27, 31
(1994).
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"the heirs of a great civilization that contributes to all humanity." 141 Presi-
dent Bush's words rang hollow, however, because even as he spoke, looters
carried away Iraq's cultural past in wheelbarrows and car trunks. 14 2 The
same great civilization that Bush praised lay burned, looted, and utterly de-
stroyed, and the Iraqi people wanted answers. One woman wept bitterly as
she told a reporter that her culture was ruined. 43 Experts agreed. Paul Zi-
mansky, an archaeologist, described the situation as the worst cultural disas-
ter in 500 years, and yet another art scholar, Eleanor Robson, stated that
"You'd have to go back centuries, to the Mongol invasion of Baghdad in
1258, to find looting on this scale."
' 144
The cultural devastation that accompanied the April 2003 invasion was
inexcusable. Although the United States did not actively participate in the
looting of Iraq, its failure to stop the widespread looting and obliteration of
cultural antiquities constitutes a wrongful act under international law, and
the United States must take full responsibility for the consequences. Occu-
pation law focuses on prohibiting an occupying power from committing
affirmative acts of destruction against an occupied territory's cultural prop-
erty. Although this body of law does not explicitly state that a State's omis-
sion is equivalent to a commission, a convincing argument exists which
places an affirmative duty on an occupying power to prevent residents of an
occupied State from looting cultural property.
This compelling argument stems from the U.N. International Law
Commission's ("ILC") characterization of an internationally wrongful act as
when a State's conduct consisting of an action or omission: A) is attribut-
able to the State under international law; and B) constitutes a breach of an
international obligation. 145 The ILC predicates a finding of culpability on
this two-prong test regardless of whether or not the State had malice or in-
tent to cause the harm. 146 Occupation law compels an occupying power to
protect cultural property, and although it does not specifically address
whether an omission to protect that property constitutes a breach, this Note
makes the argument that a State commits an internationally wrongful act not
only when its actions breach an international obligation, but when it fails to
act by omission to prevent such a breach.
141 Rich, supra note 114, § 2, at 1.
142 Id. "America sent the message that Iraq's 'great civilization,' as the president called it,
wasn't worth a single tank for protection."
143 Dexter Filkins, A Nation at War: The Reaction; An Art Center Left in Ashes, N.Y.
TIMEs, Apr. 17, 2003, at Al.
144 Rich, supra note 114, § 2, at 1.
145 Draft articles of the International Law Commission on Responsibility of States for in-
ternationally wrongful acts, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001); formally adopted by the ILC at its
2776th meeting held on July 16, 2003 (emphasis added) [hereinafter ILC for internationally
wrongful acts].
146 David Hodgkinson, Compensation for Wartime Environmental Damage: Challenges to
International Law after the Gulf War, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 405, 449 (1995).
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A. Assigning the Blame
The ILC states that a State is responsible for an internationally wrong-
ful act when that act is attributable to the State under international law.147
As stated above, the United States did not actively participate in the looting;
however it is undeniable that the United States failed to act to prevent the
pervasive looting which occurred during its occupation of Iraq. Under oc-
cupation law, the United States assumed the role of an occupying power the
moment it placed Iraq under its authority.1 48 The territory affected by this
swing in power includes any area where the occupying State has established
its authority and has the ability to exercise it. Once the United States be-
came an occupying power in Iraq, the laws of occupation dictate that the
U.S. utilize all measures to restore, and ensure "public order and safety,
while respecting ... the laws in force in the country., 149 Article 46 of the
1907 Hague Convention instructs that private property must be respected by
occupying forces, and Article 47 strictly forbids the act of pillage.
Asserting, with nothing more, that the U.S. eventually became an oc-
cupying power, raises the critical question: when did the U.S. become an
occupying power under international law? A timeline may be helpful in
answering this question, at least with respect to Baghdad, where the major-
ity of the looting took place at the National Museum and Library. U.S.
forces invaded Baghdad on Wednesday, April 9, 2003, and the city fell into
U.S. control with remarkable speed.' 5  Although pockets of resistance re-
mained - with Iraqi loyalists still a veritable threat - the U.S. exerted unde-
niable control over the city of Baghdad on April 9, 2003.152 The bulk of the
looting and destruction of the National Museum and Library of Iraq oc-
curred on Thursday, April 10, 2003, and Friday, April 11, 2003, with a near
loss of the entire collection of 170,000 artifacts in just 48 hours.153 By Sun-
day, April 13, 2003, although U.S. troops were successful in establishing
147 ILC for internationally wrongful acts, supra note 145, art.3 (2) (a).
148 1907 Hague Convention, supra note 82, para. 42.
141 Id. at para. 43.
150 Id at para. 46-47.
151 Ian Fisher, A Nation at War: Baghdad; Free to Protest, Iraqis Complain about the U.S.,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2003, at Al.
152 Burns, supra note 118, at 1 (describing the "power vacuum" that occurred when U.S.
troops entered Baghdad on Wednesday, Apr. 9, 2003 to the sound of cheering and waving
Iraqi citizens. This parade of welcome turned into a looting spree with "most of the looters.
. able to pick targets at will in plain view of American units, without fear of any American
response.").
153 John F. Burns, Baghdad Residents Begin a Long Climb to an Ordered City, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 14, 2003, at Al.
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relative order in Baghdad, looting continued to occur on a more limited
scale throughout Baghdad and in other cities occupied by U.S. forces. 1
54
One might argue that the United States cannot be expected to claim re-
sponsibility for looting which occurred just one day after its arrival into
Baghdad. This argument fails however because the law of occupation
springs into effect the moment an occupying State establishes its authority
in the territory. The U.S. ousted the Iraqi regime and established ruling
power when its tanks rolled unimpeded through the streets of Baghdad on
Wednesday, April 9, 2003.
Thus, the United States assumed the role of an occupying power in
Baghdad when it established its authority in the city and possessed the
power to exercise its authority by the presence of troops and weapons. 155
Once the United States became an occupying power in Baghdad, it triggered
the application of the rules and regulations of occupation law which govern
the behavior of an occupying State. 156 Therefore, the United States was an
occupying power, responsible for restoring public order and safety in com-
pliance with occupation law, during the period when looters ransacked the
National Museum and Library in the days following the invasion of U.S.
troops. Consequently, the looting and destruction of these cultural antiqui-
ties is attributable to the United States under the international laws of occu-
pation, thereby satisfying the first prong of the ILC's test to prove responsi-
bility for an internationally wrongful act.
B. Committing the Breach
The second prong of the test is whether the United States' conduct con-
stituted a breach of an international obligation. Although U.S. troops did
not join the mobs of looters in their destruction of Iraq's cultural treasures,
their failure to act affirmatively to stop the looters from entering museums,
galleries, libraries, and excavation sites constitutes a breach of an interna-
tional obligation under occupation law. A State commits an internationally
wrongful act when it participates in "conduct consisting of an action or
omission ... [which c]onstitutes a breach of an international obligation of
the State."' 57 The laws of occupation outline these international obligations
which govern the actions of an occupying State.'58
The Fourth Geneva Convention dedicates thirty-one articles to the laws
of occupation and discusses with detail the fundamental obligations govern-
154 Ian Fisher & John Kifner, A Nation at War: The Streets; G.I. 's and Iraqis Patrol To-
gether to Bring Order, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2003, at Al.
155 1907 Hague Convention, supra note 82, para. 42.
156 Id. at art. 43.
157 ILC for internationally wrongful acts, supra note 145, art.3 (2) (b).
158 International occupation law draws from many sources including the Fourth Geneva
Convention, the 1907 Hague Regulations on the Laws of War, Geneva Protocol 1, and cus-
tomary international law.
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ing occupying forces. One of these obligations involves the protection of
several types of property in the occupied territory that an occupying power
is obliged to safeguard from acts of destruction. Article 53 states that: "Any
destruction by the Occupying Power of real or personal property belonging
individually or collectively to private persons, or to the State, or to other
public authorities, or to social or cooperative organizations, is prohibited,
except where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military
operations."15 9
Almost thirty years later, the Geneva Protocol I refined and bolstered
the language of the Fourth Geneva Convention by elaborating on the prop-
erty protected during a period of occupation. Article 85(4) (d) of Protocol I
states that an occupying power commits a grave breach of the Protocol
when it willfully makes: "the clearly-recognized historic monuments, works
of art ... which constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples...
the object of attack, causing as a result extensive destruction thereof...
when such works of art ... are not located in the immediate proximity of
military objectives."'160 This obligation holds potentially destructive behav-
ior by the occupying power in check and highlights the importance of pre-
serving the art and cultural heritage of the occupied territory.
The United States had an obligation to protect the cultural property of
Iraq as an occupying power under international occupation law. The Fourth
Geneva Convention and the 1907 Hague Convention require an occupying
power to refrain from the destruction of private property in the occupied
territory. The Geneva Protocol I expands the occupying power's obligation
to include the specific protection of cultural property by classifying any
willful destruction of the cultural heritage of a people, including historic
monuments and works of art, as a grave breach of the Protocol. These in-
ternational conventions condemn willful actions by the occupying power to
destroy non-military targets in the occupied territory. However, a State
commits an internationally wrongful act not only when its actions breach an
international obligation, but when it fails to act by omission to prevent such
a breach. 1
61
The United States failed by omission to protect the historic monuments
and works of art which the Geneva Protocol I sought specifically to protect.
The art housed in Iraq's museums, galleries, libraries, and archaeological
excavation sites constituted the cultural heritage of the Iraqi people and its
destruction represents a devastating blow to the continuity of their rich his-
tory. Despite the expansive strategies the United States government em-
ployed in the months following the looting to restore looted and damaged
objects to Iraq, this does not preclude the determination that the United
States breached its obligation under international occupation law to protect
159 Geneva IV, supra note 124, at para. 53.
160 Geneva Protocol I, supra note 126, at art. 85(4)(d).
161 ILC for internationally wrongful acts, supra note 145, art.3 (2).
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Iraq's cultural property. The United States' failure to act to prevent looters
from pillaging and destroying Iraq's cultural heritage brings its conduct
within the ambit of a breach of an international obligation, thereby satisfy-
ing the second prong of the ILC's test to prove responsibility for an interna-
tionally wrongful act.
The 1991 war in Yugoslavia illustrates a prime example of a State fac-
ing responsibility for an internationally wrongful act based on an omission
to protect cultural property. For eight months Serbian and Croatian forces
decimated the ancient port city of Dubrovnik, inciting a global outcry at the
loss of a magnificently preserved medieval city.162 Following the war, the
U.N. created the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
("ICTY") to prosecute war crimes 163 and included crimes against cultural
property in its sixteen-count indictment.' 64 Under occupation law, the ICTY
prosecuted representatives of the State for the failure to prevent the destruc-
tion of cultural property, regardless of whether they personally caused the
devastation of the protected property. 65 The ICTY also prosecuted military
officers who "knew or had reason to know that subordinates were about to
do the same, or had done so, and failed to take the necessary and reasonable
measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators .... 166
Similarly, under the ICTY's stringent application of occupation law,
the United States is culpable for any knowledge it possessed regarding the
162 David A. Meyer, The 1954 Hague Cultural Property Convention and Its Emergence
into Customary International Law, 11 B.U. INT'L L.J., 349, 379 (1993) (citing Barry James,
Spare Dubrovnik, UNESCO Chief Pleads; Civil War Nears Renaissance City, INT'L HERALD
TRIB., Oct. 8, 1991).
163 International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Article 3(d). The ICTY
affirmed the principles and laws set out in the Geneva and Hague Conventions, and the Tri-
bunal's existence lay firmly in its commitment to protect cultural property by vowing to
prosecute anyone who violated the laws or customs of war or committed crimes against
humanity. Article 3 of the ICTY states the Tribunal's intention to prosecute any individual
responsible for the destruction of "institutions dedicated to religion, charity and education,
the arts and sciences, historic monuments and works of art and science." See also Hirad
Abtahi, The Protection of Cultural Property in Times ofArmed Conflict: The Practice of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 14 HARv. HuM. RTS. J. 1, 9
(2001) (discussing that the ICTY Statute criminalized certain behaviors to prevent future
atrocities from occurring. "The incorporation of norms in its Statute demonstrated the seri-
ousness of the crimes and their condemnation by the international community as a result of
its failure to protect them.").
164 The ICTY held members of both Croatian and Serbian troops responsible for mutually
contributing to the destruction of Dubrovnik's palaces, mansions, libraries, churches and
monasteries. This set a historic precedent because it was the first time since World War II
that a tribunal indicted individuals for crimes against cultural property.
165 The ICTY indicted members of the armed forces of the Croatian Defense Council with
counts of "wanton and extensive destruction and/or plundering of Bosnian Muslim dwell-
ings, buildings, businesses, institutions dedicated to religion or education, and civilian per-
sonal property and livestock." ICTY, Blaskic and Kordic Indictment and Judgment.
166 ICTY, Blaskic and Kordic Indictment and Judgment.
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commission of cultural crimes in Iraq. By failing to take the necessary
measures to prevent looters from ransacking Iraqi artifacts, war planners,
acting on behalf of the United States, placed the U.S. in a position poised to
breach the international obligation to protect cultural property under occu-
pation law.
The United States may argue that it is not responsible for the destruc-
tive looting of Iraq's cultural property because the widespread pillage was
an unforeseen event. Under international law, the illegality of a State's act
is precluded if it is due to the "occurrence of an irresistible force or ... an
unforeseen event, beyond the control of the State, making it materially im-
possible in the circumstances to perform the obligation.",167 This argument
fails, however, for two reasons: 1) The looting in Iraq appears to be profes-
sional and planned, which raises the question of why the United States
could not foresee an open opportunity for mass looting of priceless artifacts
when thousands of professional looters obviously could; and 2) The U.S.
Defense Department ignored the findings of the State Department's "Future
of Iraq Project" which predicted widespread looting and destruction in Iraq
following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime.
1. A Professional Job
In May 2003, at an INTERPOL168 conference, Attorney General John
Ashcroft admitted that the looting of Iraqi museums and galleries was an
inside job, carried out by professionals who knew exactly what they were
after and the value of their loot. 169 The first clue that alerted investigators to
the possibility that professional art thieves orchestrated the looting was the
fact that the museum records were systematically destroyed. Museum in-
ventories provide historical information for each item in a museum's collec-
tion; more importantly, these documents provide proof that the antiquities
belong to the museum. In order for a museum to register an item as stolen,
it must first prove that the stolen object belonged to the museum at the time
167 ILC for internationally wrongful acts, supra note 145, at art.23 (emphasis added).
168 The International Criminal Police Organization ("INTERPOL") is the largest interna-
tional police organization in the world. INTERPOL was founded in 1923 to assist cross-
border criminal police cooperation and it consists of 181 member countries in five conti-
nents.
169 Looting was professional job, Ashcroft says, Assoc. PRESS, May 7, 2003, available at
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/nationworld/iraq/bal-te.loot07may07,0,4063565.story
(quoting Ashcroft as saying "[f]rom the evidence that has emerged, there is a strong case to
be made that the looting and theft of the artifacts were perpetrated by organized criminal
groups - criminals who knew precisely what they were looking for."); see also Pro thieves
took Iraq's treasures, experts say, Assoc. PRESS, Apr. 19, 2003 available at http://www.
museum-security.org/03/056.html (quoting McGuire Gibson, president of the American
Association for Research in Baghdad and a professor at the University of Chicago, as stating
"[iut looks as if part of the theft was a very, very deliberate, planned action. It really looks
like a very professional job.").
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of the theft.170  Because it is extraordinarily difficult to prove ownership
without documentation, destroying museum records effectively hampers
future efforts to track down stolen antiquities.' 7' An uneducated looter
might not know or care about this, but a professional art thief certainly
would.
It may come as no surprise then that the records office at the National
Museum in Baghdad was thoroughly ransacked and destroyed. 172 One ex-
pert stated, "[t]he purpose obviously is you're making it harder for material
to be identified and be claimed in the future. So if there was any organiza-
tion, that to me is one indication of it."'173 Even in the instances where the
paper records and microfilm were not destroyed by looters, most of the ma-
terials were dumped on the floor and muddled in a way that will take mu-
seum employees "months if not years to sort out.' 174 By that time, the art
may be lost forever.
The second indication that the looting was professional and planned re-
sulted from the type of tools that looters utilized. Museum curators discov-
ered glass-cutters, a variety not available for sale in Iraq, among the debris,
leading the museum employees to believe that outside professionals stole
some of the looted art. 175 Employees of the National Museum in Baghdad
believe that some of the looters used museum keys to enter the building.
76
It is unclear how they gained access to these keys without a connection to a
museum employee, unless they were employees of the museum themselves.
In addition to glass-cutters and keys, looters employed elaborate equipment
to steal valuable objects that curators were unable to lock away for safe-
keeping, due to the objects' massive size. In one instance, thieves stole a
7,000 year-old bronze bust weighing hundreds of kilograms, presumably
using professional equipment to remove the enormous sculpture. 77 Accord-
170 Gottlieb & Meier, supra note 26, at A16.
171 Meier & Gottlieb, supra note 32, at Al (stating that if a record exists linking a piece of
art to a particular museum or a legitimate owner, then the market value on the black market
is zero).
172 Joseph Coleman, Looting of Iraqi antiquities may have been a professional job, Assoc.
PREss, Apr. 17, 2003 available at http://www.post-gazette.com/ World/20030417 muse-
umswp4.asp.
173 Id. (quoting Neil Brodie, of the McDonald Institute for Archaeological Research in
Cambridge, England).
174 Gottlieb & Meier, supra note 26, at A16 (quoting John Curtis of the British Museum's
Near East Department).
175 Jim Clancy, Museum shattered by looters, CNN NEwS, Apr. 16, 2003 available at
http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/04/15/otsc.irq.clancy/ (describing the devastated
National Museum in Baghdad in April shortly after the looting with images of smashed glass
and hacked in doorways and hallways piled high with rubble).
176 Looting was professional job, Ashcroft says, supra note 169 available at http://www.
baltimoresun.com/news/nationworld/iraq/bal-te.loot07may07,0,4063565.story.
177 Clancy, supra note 175 at http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/ 04/15/otsc.irq.
clancy/.
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ing to museum officials, only a professional art thief could accomplish such
a feat.'
78
The third clue suggesting that professional art thieves executed the
looting stems from the extreme skill and selectivity employed in their dis-
cernment of precious original artifacts from less valuable imitations. Re-
productions of artifacts, which would look genuine to an angry mob of ordi-
nary thieves, were ignored and left untouched by the looters. 179 The thieves
had a keen eye for discriminating the original antiquities from the replica
pieces. In one case, looters pillaged an entire cabinet of ancient signature
seals that were extremely valuable, but left the surrounding rooms in the
vault completely untouched. 80 Similarly, museum officials at the National
Museum reported that looters ignored the expansive Egypt collection, which
is historically significant but not especially valuable.' "It is clear that the
person who did this had intimate knowledge of the museum and its storage
practices."'' 82 Based on the fact that looters utilized museum keys to open
the vaults and pick out the most valuable objects, it is not difficult for ex-
perts to arrive at a common conclusion: the looting was organized outside
the country. 1
83
The evidence of a professionally planned looting scheme is over-
whelming. If international art thieves organized the looting, it is improbable
that such an elaborate orchestrated effort could be thrown together at the
last moment. This raises valid speculation as to why the United States gov-
ernment did not plan for the possibility of looting when even the looters saw
the opportunity. The United States cannot argue that the looting in Iraq was
unforeseeable when hundreds of experts flocked to the White House months
before the invasion bearing warnings that widespread looting would occur.
The United States possessed the power to prevent the looting that occurred
during the invasion and it cannot elude the responsibility it assumed when it
became an occupying power in Iraq.
178 Id.
179 Coleman, supra note 172 available at http://www.post-gazette.com/World/20030417
museumswp4.asp (quoting Donny George, director general of Iraq's state board of antiqui-
ties, as stating "[t]he people who came in here knew what they wanted."... "These were not
random looters.").
180 Looting was professional job, Ashcroft says, supra note 169 available at
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/nationworld/iraq/bal-te.loot07may07,0,4063565.story
(discussing that the looters appeared interested only in the valuable seals hidden in the small
cabinet and disregarded the nearby rooms brimming with artifacts).
181 Coleman, supra note 172 available at http://www.post-gazette.com/World/20030417
museumswp4.asp.
182 Looting was professional job, Ashcroft says, supra note 169 available at
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/nationworld/iraq/bal-te.loot07mayO7,0,4063565.story
(quoting Lt. Col. Matthew Bogdanos).
183 Pro thieves took Iraq's treasures, experts say, supra note 169 available at
http://www.museum-security.org/03/056.html.
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2. Conflict within the White House
The mass looting and destruction that occurred following the 1991 War
provided ample proof that U.S. troops should be prepared for more of the
same following another invasion of Iraq. The State Department understood
this and it spent a great deal of time and resources planning out the role that
troops would play in the aftermath of the invasion. 184 For reasons that re-
main unclear, the Department of Defense disregarded the State Depart-
ment's classified project, entitled the "Future of Iraq Project," (the "Pro-
ject") before it ever had the chance to be useful.1 85
What made the Defense Department's decision to discard the Project
so unbelievable was that the Project had actually predicted and planned for
widespread looting in Iraq following the invasion. 86 "It was entirely pre-
dictable that in the absence of any authority in Baghdad that you'd have
chaos and lawlessness," stated a member of the project.1 87 The Project
voiced its theories regarding Iraq's susceptibility to looting in its reports to
the State Department prior to the United States' invasion of Iraq. It is un-
clear who ordered the reports or who the intended audience was; and these
questions remain unanswered because the reports were never used. In the
months leading up to the U.S. invasion of Iraq, an ongoing power struggle
existed between the State and Defense Departments. 181- In March 2003, the
Defense Department asserted control over the United States' involvement in
Iraq, including the invasion and post-war reconstruction planning, and the
State Department's "Future of Iraq Project" was the main casualty of that
control swap.
In October 2003, the State Department released thirteen volumes of de-
tailed reports, which are not available to the public, written by the Project
for the internal use of the State Department, to members of Congress and
reporters for the New York Times. 1 These reports reveal that the Project
warned that "the period immediately after regime change might offer...
criminals the opportunity to engage in acts of killing, plunder and loot-
ing."' 190 According to the State Department's reports, Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld instructed General Jay Garner, leader of reconstruction in
Iraq, to ignore the State Department's Future of Iraq Project and its ideas
184 David Rieff, Blueprint for a Mess, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2003, § 6, at 28.
185 Id.
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 Id.
189 Id.
190 Id.
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regarding postwar planning. 19' This proved to be a serious error in strategy
and judgment.
The Defense Department was short on time and resources with its
planning of postwar events beginning less than one month before the inva-
sion.192 Although it considered customary needs in a postwar climate - for
example, housing crises and food shortages - it never expected rampant
looting and mass devastation to museums and libraries. General Garner
stated that he had expected angry Iraqis to destroy the symbols of Saddam
Hussein's regime, including palaces and monuments, but he was utterly
unprepared for the widespread looting and carnage of every public building
in Baghdad. 193 "In hindsight, we would have put more military police units
and more civil reconstruction units into the flow," stated one retired general,
however "[i]t was not predictable at the time we were putting the plan to-
gether."' 94 Experts refute the idea that the U.S. government did not realize
there would be an insufficient number of troops to maintain peace during
the invasion.1 95 One Army Chief of Staff reports that he warned the Penta-
gon that in order to maintain stability in Iraq during and after the invasion,
several hundred thousand troops would be necessary - a number that civil-
ians at the Pentagon scoffed at. 
196
The United States faces a daunting challenge if it attempts to argue its
ignorance regarding the likelihood of looting in Iraq during its planning of
the April 2003 military invasion. The fact that the State Department com-
missioned the Future of Iraq Project to outline strategies to maintain peace
and order throughout the regime change demonstrates that there was a fore-
seeable possibility that events might not occur smoothly. The Project's
detailed reports explicitly discuss the probability of mass looting, rioting,
and general chaos following the U.S. invasion. These predictions should
not have appeared extraordinary in light of the United States' experience in
191 Id. (discussing the content of the Future of Iraq Project reports which are unavailable to
the public.).
192 Id.
193 Id.
194 Martha Raddatz, Too Late? Critics Say United States Should Have Prevented Iraqi
Looting, ABC NEWS.COM, Apr. 17, 2003 available at http://abcnews.go.com/sections/
wnt/World/Iraq_030417Lootingraddatz.html (quoting retired Marine Lt. Gen. Gregory
Newbold).
195 In the aftermath of the looting, three of President Bush's advisors resigned in protest:
Martin Sullivan, Richard S. Lanier, and Gary Vikan. Mr. Sullivan told Reuters news agency
that, "It didn't have to happen. In a pre-emptive war that's the kind of thing you should have
planned for." Similarly, Mr. Lanier attacked "the administration's total lack of sensitivity
and forethought regarding the Iraq invasion and loss of cultural treasures." See US experts
resign over Iraqi looting, BBC NEWS WORLD ED., Apr. 18, 2003 available at
http://news. bbc.co.uk/J/hi/entertainment/arts/2958009.stm.
196 Raddatz, supra note 194 available at http://abcnews.go.com/sections/wnt/World/
Iraq_030417Lootingraddatz.html (discussing Army Chief of Staff Eric Shinsheki's assess-
ment of the problem of troop shortages in Iraq).
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the 1991 War, when looting ravaged Iraq following the U.S. military inva-
sion. If the United States ignored these substantial warnings, this reckless
conduct precludes any contention it might raise that the looting and destruc-
tion of Iraq's cultural property was unforeseeable.
IV. In Search of a Legal Remedy: A Managed Art Market
When the United States invaded Iraq in April 2003, revenues from the
illegal art market were at an all time high with estimates ranging from $300
million to $6 billion per year. 197 The irony is that in a time where more
laws protecting art exist than ever before, art appears to be at its most vul-
nerable. The international art market buckles under a multitude of laws
protecting cultural property and constraining art sales simultaneously.'
98
These laws, such as the United States' National Stolen Protection Act
("NSPA") and patrimony laws of foreign States, reduce the amount of art
allowed for legal export, creating a volatile environment ripe for an expand-
ing illegal market. It was this volatility that played a major role in the wide-
spread looting and destruction of Iraq's cultural antiquities following the
United States' invasion.
Frederick Schultz, the New York art dealer convicted in 2003 of re-
ceiving stolen antiquities in violation of the NSPA, would likely be the first
person to agree that the art market has changed dramatically in the last
twenty years. 199 Mr. Schultz now spends his days in a New Jersey prison,
where he is serving 33 months for violating a law that - until recently -
could not have been used to convict him of his crime. 00 The hotly dis-
cussed Schultz case brought converts to both sides of the debate. Those
against the decision in Schultz argue that U.S. courts set a dangerous prece-
dent by permitting an NSPA indictment based on foreign patrimony laws,
and they fear that the court's decision might "have a catastrophic impact on
,,201
the art world and the public interests it serves. On the other hand, a ma-
197 E.g. Dave Gill & Christopher Chippindale, The Trade in Looted Antiquities and the
Return of Cultural Property, 11 INT'L J. OF CUL. PROP., 50, 51 (2002) (discussing statistics
from law enforcement data and statistics from the European Association of Archaeologists
who estimate that the annual illegal art trade yields approximately $4.5 billion).
198 Cf Geraldine Norman, Talking Turkey, THE INDEP. (London), June 13, 1993 (discussing
the difficulties facing collectors in the face of complex foreign patrimony laws).
199 Meier & Gottlieb, supra note 32, at Al (discussing the time period surrounding Mr.
Schultz's crime as "the decade.., of enormous changes in the antiquities world, all accom-
panied by heightened legal scrutiny and the.. . long and bitter debate about the ethics of the
trade").
200 Schultz, 333 F.3d at 416. This case marked the first instance of a U.S. court using the
NSPA to prosecute and find an individual guilty of violating a foreign law which claimed
ownership of all antiquities in the State of origin - even antiquities undiscovered at the time
the law was enacted.
201 Lufkin, supra note 57, at 316 ("Dealers, collectors and museums will be forced to aban-
don the trade and collection of any objects that any foreign government may ultimately
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jority of art scholars and archeologists passionately fight for a nationalistic
approach to art trade and preservation. They staunchly approve of applying
the NSPA to dealers and collectors who buy and sell artifacts removed from
their source nations in violation of foreign patrimony laws.2 °2
Theories abound for a managed art market that would re-open the pas-
sages of trade that many nations have closed with nationalistic patrimony
laws.203 A managed market offers an international approach to art collec-
tion by allowing many nations to own art from around the world; enabling
collectors to study and enjoy the diversity that comes from a variety of cul-
tures and civilizations. An infinite array of applications exists for a man-
aged art market, and the key to establishing a system that works is to avoid
extremes. For instance, it would be foolish to completely uproot existing
national patrimony laws in source nations because their underlining purpose
of protecting art represents the goal of most collectors. This Note suggests
a managed art market that would modify existing nationalistic art laws, but
would not tamper with the spirit in which these laws were conceived.
Art lobby groups speculate that a managed art market would halt ille-
gal trade and send grave robbers and looters packing. Many experts in
agreement with the philosophy of a managed art market cite preservation of
antiquities as a primary objective. 2° Often, source nations possessing the
richest cultural property are in the worst economic circumstances, and many
of these countries are unable to preserve their artifacts appropriately. 20 5 A
managed art market allows source nations to sell the property they cannot
maintain for the resources they badly need.
Proponents of cultural nationalism disagree with this distribution of ar-
tifacts to wealthier nations: "To the cultural nationalist, the destruction of
national cultural property through inadequate care is regrettable, but might
be preferable to its 'loss' through export.,20 6 To an art historian or archae-
ologist, the value of an artifact is interwoven in the information it offers to
its historical genre. These individuals would likely argue that the signifi-
cance of art is compromised if a managed market encourages objects to
become disconnected from their environment of origin. Much of the debate
surrounding the merits of a managed market stem from the fact that sup-
claim,"... "Existing collections also will be affected: collectors and museums that acquired
objects in good faith reliance on U.S. law will be placed at risk.").
202 Edmund L. Andrews, Afteraffects: Anarchy; Iraqi Looters Tearing Up Archaeological
Sites, N.Y. TIMEs, May 23, 2003 at Al.
203 Merryman, supra note 24, at 831.
204 Id.
205 John P. Shinn, A New World Order for Cultural Property, 34 SANCLR 977, 979 (1994)
("There is nothing new about the international movement of works of art, including perma-
nent transfers of works of art from one nation to another. What is relatively new is the virtu-
ally wholesale illicit expatriation of works of art from nations rich in cultural heritage to
nations that are rich in economic terms.").
206 Merryman, supra note 24, at 834.
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porters of the theory often view art as a business, whereas detractors con-
sider art an homage to history. These factions remain at odds with each
other over every aspect of an open market, with both groups constructing
valid, convincing arguments.
Art dealers and collectors respond to nationalistic ownership laws by
seeking solace and strength in solidarity. Private interest groups, such as
the American Council for Cultural Policy ("ACCP"), represent powerful art
lobbying forces in Washington and their influence should not be underesti-
mated.2°' These groups argue against foreign ownership laws that prevent
collectors from removing art from its nation of origin because they consider
such laws retentionist in nature.208 In January 2003, members of the ACCP
met with government officials from the State and Defense Department in
Washington, where they offered "post-war technical and financial assis-
tance" and "conservation support" to government officials.20 9 This meeting
made some individuals in the art world nervous.
Many organizations consider it inappropriate for the ACCP to offer the
United States government advice regarding post-war planning for Iraq's
antiquities market.210 "The ACCP's agenda is to encourage the collecting of
antiquities through weakening the laws of archaeologically-rich nations and
eliminate national ownership of antiquities to allow for easier export,"
stated one expert. 21 1 Art historians and archaeologists express alarm at any
indication that the United States may seek to ease restrictions on the export
of Iraqi art to wealthier "art hungry" nations.212
207 Liam McDougall, U.S. Accused of Plans to Loot Iraqi Antiques, SUNDAY HERALD UK,
Apr. 6, 2003 available at http://www.sundayherald.com/32895 (discussing that the ACCP,
whose membership consists of accomplished art lawyers, professional antiquities collectors,
and successful art dealers, has always been a source of unease for many archaeologists due to
the fact that some of the private collections held by ACCP members have questionable histo-
ries, including some pieces which were allegedly stolen by Nazi forces during World War
II).
208 A retentionist philosophy is a belief that art should remain in the country it originated
from.
209 McDougall, supra note 207 available at http://www.sundayherald.com/32895 (discuss-
ing that many archaeologists and art historians have voiced their concern that the ACCP's
meeting with government officials at the White House in January was inappropriate. They
argue that there is a clear conflict of interest between the self-interested goals of the ACCP
and the duties of the United States as an occupying power in Iraq.).
210 For instance, the Archaeological Institute of America ("AIA"), who characterizes the
ACCP's clout with the White House as substantial, states its concern over any influence the
ACCP might have over U.S. policies toward antiquities in Iraq.
21 McDougall, supra note 207 available at http://www.sundayherald.com/32895 (quoting
AIA president, Patty Gerstenblith. The AIA is adamant about maintaining Iraq's pre-existing
laws banning the export of antiquities, and it believes that any effort by the United States to
weaken those strict laws would be "disastrous.").
212 Id. (quoting Professor Lord Renfrew, a leading British archaeologist and director of the
McDonald Institute for Archaeological Research, as stating "Iraqi antiquities legislation
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However, many independent collectors and dealers claim that they, not
art, are under attack, citing the strict export laws of foreign nations, U.S. art
protection laws, and the retentionist ideology of many art scholars and ar-
213chaeologists. In reality, most antiquities that surface on the market today
214appear without a trace of history or archaeological context. The modem
art collector has an overwhelming responsibility to research the history of
any object she seeks to buy, in addition to understanding the ramifications
of any national ownership laws associated with the object. Many dealers
and collectors feel besieged by the amount of information that they are ex-
pected to amass before making an informed, and one may hope, legal pur-
chase.21 5
As Iraq begins the slow process of cultural renewal following the dev-
astating looting of its past, the Iraqi people must decide the approach to
international trade that will best protect their cultural property and give
them the resources to rebuild. A managed art market would allow Iraq to
export its cultural property legally for the first time, and enable the muse-
ums of Iraq to replenish empty shelves with Iraqi art as well as art from
around the world. One might argue that it is unnecessary for Iraq to open its
doors to a managed art market because it does not need the financial reve-
nues of legal art sales. However, this argument misses the purpose of a
managed art market completely. The 1954 Hague Convention represents a
vivid reminder that art belongs to the world; and the pleasure of collecting
and enjoying art belongs to the people of every nation. The managed art
market approach embodies these principles by allowing collectors to study
and enjoy the diversity that comes from a variety of cultures and civiliza-
tions.
Iraq is home to an incredibly rich source of antiquities which surpasses
the art resources of most nations in the world. If the Iraqi people decide to
change Iraq's existing patrimony laws in order to allow a certain percentage
of art to flow freely from their nation to the hands of another, vast changes
would develop in the international art market. Proponents of this shift fore-
see a dramatic decrease in illegal trading of cultural antiquities, in addition
to a decrease in the financial burden that source nations must bear in order
to maintain and preserve artifacts.2 16
protects Iraq. The last thing one needs is some group of dealer-connected Americans interfer-
ing.").
213 David D'Arcy, Legal Group tofight "retentionist" policies, THE ART NEWSPAPER.COM,
at http://www.theartnewspaper.com/news/article.asp?idart=-10176 (A retentionist philosophy
is a belief that art should remain in the country it originated from).
214 Gill & Chippindale, supra note 197, at 54 (discussing that in light of the stringent na-
tional ownership laws enacted over the last two decades, a large share of the objects that turn
up for sale lacking biographical paperwork presumably have a checkered past).
215 See Merryman, supra note 24, at 832.
216 Shinn, supra note 205, at 979.
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This Note does not advocate the complete termination of Iraq's patri-
mony laws; rather it suggests a shift in the theory behind the nationalistic
laws to the principle of cultural internationalism that a managed art market
embodies. The legal structure of the Iraqi art market rests on the priorities
of its people. If Iraq chooses to enter a managed art market, it must learn to
strike a balance between satisfying the world's desire to share Iraq's cultural
history and maintaining Iraqi antiquities with a concern for integrity and
preservation. If Iraq can accomplish this challenging task, it will begin a
new chapter in the international art market.
V. Conclusion
The United States occupies Iraq during a tenuous time in the history of
art preservation and trade.217 The looting in Iraq during the U.S. invasion
threw salt in the already festering wounds of the international art commu-
nity, launching the hotly debated topics of looting, trade, and patrimony
accommodations into a full-blown media frenzy. It is impossible to intelli-
gently discuss the United States' breach of its obligation under international
occupation law - to protect Iraq's antiquities from looting - without a can-
did review of the chaos that gripped the international art market in April
2003. The build-up of cultural property laws created a virtual stonewall
effect on dealers and collectors, preventing these groups from acquiring the
art they so badly wanted. The United States' invasion of Iraq provided a
period of lawlessness without consequences that opened the floodgates of
antiquities to the illegal art market. The combination of poverty-stricken
Iraqis yearning for money, the relatively easy access to valuable antiquities
following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's iron fisted regime, and the
yearning of international art collectors cut off from these treasured artifacts
by cultural property laws all came together to create a situation ripe for dis-
aster.
The United States was responsible under international occupation laws
to foresee that looting would likely occur following its invasion. The hun-
dreds of experts who trooped through the White House in the months and
weeks before the invasion informed the United States of the dire condition
of the international art market. The United States should have been on alert
that an invasion of Iraq would create a perfect opportunity for looters in
light of an art market starved for Middle Eastern antiquities protected by
Iraq's nationalistic patrimony laws. The fact that the United States failed to
plan adequately for a disaster so entirely foreseeable represents its gravest
breach.
The path that the United States chooses to take regarding the regulation
of antiquities in Iraq will not be easy - regardless of the choice. Whether it
217 Filipov, supra note 5, at A14; ("It is a dangerous business, but easy compared with
smuggling under the Hussein regime, when borders were closed and the punishment was
death by hanging. Anyone caught these days can get off with a $400 bribe.").
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chooses to establish a managed art market or continue the enforcement of
Iraq's historical patrimony laws, nothing will bring back the thousands of
priceless artifacts lost in the April 2003 looting. The Hague Convention
states that the world owns cultural property in a collective sense. The an-
cient history of one nation reflects the history of many. When the United
States failed to prevent the looting of antiquities in Iraq, it not only allowed
the destruction of Iraqi art - it allowed the destruction of the world's his-
tory.
